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Comments and Casenotes
Constitutionality Of Miscegenation Statutes
McLaughlin v. Florida'
The appellants, a Negro man and a white woman, were convicted
of violating a Florida statute2 which proscribed cohabitation between
Negro and white persons who are not married to each other. The
Florida Supreme Court upheld the conviction. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the appellants claimed :' (1) The
statute was invalid as a denial of equal protection of the laws since it
applied only to members of certain races, and (2) they were denied
due process and equal protection of the laws because a Florida law
prohibiting interracial marriage4 prevented them from establishing the
defense of common law marriage.5 The appellants thus hoped to reach
the issue of whether the state's prohibition of interracial marriage con-
travened the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court, basing its
decision on the single issue of equal protection (appellants' first claim),
set aside the conviction and invalidated the cohabitation statute.
Finding this claim to be dispositive of the case, the Court refrained
from expressing any view as to the constitutionality of the law pro-
hibiting interracial marriages.
The provisions of state statutes banning interracial marriage,
often called miscegenation' statutes, vary considerably, but today all
states which have such statutes ban Negro-white marriages, and all
declare the proscribed interracial marriages void. Most statutes provide
criminal penalties, thus making race an element of a crime. The Mary-
1. 85 S.Ct. 283 (1964).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.05 (1961). "Any negro man and white woman, or
any white man and negro woman, who are not married to each other, who shall
habitually live in and occupy in the nighttime the same room shall each be punished by
imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or by fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars."
3. The appellants also claimed that the statutory definition of Negro was uncon-
stitutionally vague. The Court found it unnecessary to consider this claim.
4. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 24; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.11 (1961).
5. Florida accords a common law marriage the same legal incidents as a formal
marriage. Chaachou v. Chaachou, 73 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1954). During the course of
the trial, the state had introduced evidence to the effect that each appellant had, prior
to his conviction, claimed to be married to another, and therefore they were not hurt
by the interracial marriage prohibitions. Brief for Appellee, pp. 4-6, McLaughlin v.
Florida, 85 S.Ct. 283 (1964).
6. Miscegenation means any interbreeding of races or any sexual relations be-
tween individuals of different races. The word is derived from the Latin miscere, to
mix, plus genus, race. WEBsTER, N~w INTtRNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1961). In
this article, however, the word is used in the narrower sense and means interracial
marriage.
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land statute, for example, proscribes Negro-white and Malay-white
marriages and has a mandatory penitentiary sentence. 7
At one time or another, over half the states had miscegenation
statutes. Although these statutes have been repealed by twenty state
legislatures,8 they remain in effect in nineteen other states.9 Six states
have included miscegenation prohibitions in their state constitutions.10
The highest courts of only two states have held their miscegenation
statutes unconstitutional. Alabama declared its statute unconstitutional
in 1872" but reversed itself five years later ;12 California declared its
statute unconstitutional in 1948.1" State courts' 4 and lower federal
courts' 5 have upheld the constitutionality of such statutes. The Supreme
Court of the United States has never ruled on the issue. In two cases
reaching that Court in recent years, certiorari was denied in one1
and the issue bypassed in the other."7
7. 3 MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 398 (1957).
8. States which repealed miscegenation statutes before 1900: Massachusetts, 1843;
Iowa, 1851; Kansas, 1857; Washington, 1867; Rhode Island, 1881; Maine, 1883;
Michigan, 1883; New Mexico, 1886; Ohio, 1887. States which have repealed since
1900: Oregon, 1951; Montana, 1953; North Dakota, 1955; Colorado, 1957; South
Dakota, 1957; California, 1959 (adjudicated unconstitutional in 1948, see note 13
below) ; Idaho, 1959; Nevada, 1959; Arizona, 1962; Nebraska, 1963; Utah, 1963.
9. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming. ALA. CODS tit. 14, § 360 (1958) ;
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-104 (1947) ; DtL. CODS ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1953) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 741.11 (1961); GA. CoIg ANN. § 53-106 (1961) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 44-104
(Burns, 1952); Ky. Rtv. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (1963); LA. CIVIL CODS art. 94
(1952); LA. Rgv. STAT. ch. 9, art. 201 (1950); MD. CODS ANN. art. 27, § 398 (1957) ;
MISS. CODS ANN. § 459 (1956) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. § 451.020 (1952); N.C. GSN. STAT.§ 51-3 (1950) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 12 (1954) ; S.C. CODI § 20-7 (1962);
TnNN. CODS ANN. § 36-402 (1955); Tix. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4607 (1960); VA.
CODS § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.); W.VA. CoDS ANN. § 4697 (1961); Wyo. STAT.
§ 20-18 (1951). Companion statutes exist providing criminal penalties for persons
issuing marriage licenses or performing marriage ceremonies in contravention of
miscegenation statutes.
10. Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee:
ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 102; FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 24; MIss. CONST. art. 14, § 263;
N.C. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 8; S.C. CoNsT. art. 3, § 33; TZNN. CONST. art. 11, § 14.
11. Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 17 Am. Rep. 739 (1872).
12. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 27 Am. Rep. 739 (1877).
13. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), often cited as Perez
v. Sharp.
14. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) ; State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882
(1942) ; Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895) ; Jackson v. Denver, 109
Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942) ; Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869) ; State v. Gibson,
36 Ind. 389 (1871) ; Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140 (1948) ; State v.
Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883) ; State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877) ; Eggers v. Olson,
104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483 (1924); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heiskell) 287
(1871); Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
15. Ex parte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 699 (No. 5047) (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1879) ; In re
Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262 (No. 6550) (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871); Ex parte Kinney, 14 Fed.
Cas. 602 (No. 7825) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879); State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (S.D. Ga.
1890) ; Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944).
16. Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So. 2d 114, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888
(1954). In an earlier case, In re Monks' Estate, 48 Cal. App. 2d 603, 120 P.2d 167
(1941), an appeal was dismissed, 317 U.S. 590 (1942), because the record was unclear
as to whether the statute of limitations had run; rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 711 (1942).
17. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E2d 749, remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955),
aff'd, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
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No doubt, states may regulate marriage.'" These regulations,
however, may not contravene the fourteenth amendment. 9 The due
process clause of the amendment protects the individual's right to
marry,2 ° and the equal protection clause protects the individual from
regulations based on arbitrary distinctions.2 Distinctions and regula-
tions based on race alone are especially suspect.22 The usual presump-
tion of constitutionality of legislation does not apply; instead the
burden is on the state to show that the law is necessary for the protection
of the health, safety, or general welfare of the community.3 Some of
the reasons why this should be so were stated in the case of Perez v.
Lippold"4 wherein the California court held that its state's miscegena-
tion statute was unconstitutional.
"Marriage is thus something more than a civil contract subject
to regulation by the state; it is a fundamental right of free men.
There can be no prohibition of marriage except for an important
social objective and by reasonable means. . . . Since the essence
of the right to marry is freedom to join in marriage with the
person of one's choice, a segregation statute for marriage neces-
18. "Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more
to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has
always been subject to the control of the [state] legislature." Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
19. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 1.
The supremacy clause of the Constitution states: "This Constitution . . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land .... " U.S. CONST. art. VI.
20. "While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish
a home and bring up children ... "
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). (Emphasis added.)
21. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 406 (1928) ; Dominion Hotel, Inc. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265,
268 (1919).
22. "[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect .... [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions;
racial antagonism never can." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
23. "Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular
care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect."
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), decided the same day and based upon the
same reasoning as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown v.
Board of Education has been explicitly relied upon in the many per curiam decisions
striking down laws based upon racial classification in areas outside education. The
Court has also struck down laws discriminatory in their application although innocent
on their face, Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) ; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S.
463 (1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). In the much criticized decisions,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943), the Court held that the restrictions placed upon persons of
Japanese ancestry living on the west coast at the beginning of World War II werejustified only because of the grave national emergency. These last two cases dealt
with the war powers of the federal government and contain significant dicta concerning
the presumption against constitutionality of legislative classification by race.
24. 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
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sarily impairs the right to marry .... Legislation infringing such
rights must be based upon more than prejudice and must be free
from oppressive discrimination to comply with the constitutional
requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws."'2 5
Two Supreme Court decisions, Plessy v. Ferguson26 and Pace v.
Alabama,2' are usually relied upon as supporting the constitutionality
of statutes prohibiting interracial marriage. In Plessy a suit was brought
as an attack on the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute requiring
separate facilities for Negroes and whites on trains. However, the
Court addressed itself to the broad issue of the legality of race separa-
tion in the light of the fourteenth amendment. By way of support for
upholding the statute, the Court cited the prevalent practice of school
segregation and the policy against miscegenist marriages. The Court,
in dictum, stated, "Laws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races
may be said in a technical sense to interfere with the freedom of con-
tract, and yet have been universally recognized as within the police
power of the state."2 The Court has explicitly rejected the portion of
Plessy referring to public education.29 ICC regulations now prohibit
racial segregation in interstate transportation30 and statutes requiring
segregation in intrastate transportation are no longer valid.3' How-
ever, Plessy has never been explicitly overruled, possibly because of the
dictum concerning interracial marriage.
In Pace, the Court upheld a portion of the Alabama miscegenation
statute, which provides criminal penalties for interracial marriage,
fornication, or cohabitation. The only issue before the Court was
whether the statute violated the fourteenth amendment because the
penalty was greater for interracial fornication than for intraracial
fornication; the facts did not require the Court to examine the marriage
or cohabitation portions of the statute. The Court, in upholding the
statute, found that there was no discrimination against a person
because of his race, and "The punishment of each offending person,
whether white or black, is the same."' 32 In the principal case, the Court
re-examined the Pace decision and stated that Pace presented a limited
interpretation of the equal protection clause that has not withstood
the test of time. It is not enough, said the Court, that a statute apply
equally to all members of the included class; instead the inquiry must
be directed to whether there is an arbitrary discrimination between
those classes covered and those excluded by the particular statute, and
whether the classifications are reasonable in light of the statute's pur-
pose. The principal case numbers among those in the past decade which
make it doubtful whether Pace and Plessy have any remaining vitality.
State and lower federal court decisions generally give three rea-
sons for upholding miscegenation statutes: (1) regulation of marriage
25. Id. at 18, 19 and 21. (Emphasis added.)
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
28. 163 U.S. at 545.
29. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. 54 Stat. 902 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1), § 316(d) (1958).
31. See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirming, 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala. 1956).
32. 106 U.S. at 585.
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is exclusively a state function, 3 (2) equal protection is achieved
because the restraints apply equally to all individuals, 4 (3) the statutes
are a reasonable means of accomplishing valid legislative objectives.33
1. ExCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF THE STATES.
The premise that the fourteenth amendment is not applicable to
state regulation of marriage is based upon the congressional debates
over the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, 6 the Civil Rights Act 7 of 1866,
and the debates over the amendment itself. 8 The debates reveal that
the bills were not intended to be applicable to miscegenation statutes. 39
But then again a study of the debate also reveals that the statutes were
not intended to apply to state education, jury service, or suffrage laws
either. Nevertheless these have been considered as within the ambit
of the fourteenth amendment.4 ° Therefore the extension of the four-
teenth amendment to the area of marriage regulation seems to be a
short and reasonable step.
2. EQUAL APPLICATION OF THE LAW.
The requirements of the equal protection clauses were said to have
been satisfied so long as all offenders under a statute were given equal
punishment.4 The principle case refers to this concept as a "narrow
view"42 of the equal protection clause. The inquiry which must be
made is whether the statutory classification of offenders is reasonable
in light of the statute's purpose.43 No state has ever prohibited all
interracial marriages ;44 the miscegenation statutes apply to only certain
designated races. Therefore, the validity of these statutes rests upon
33. See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1944).
34. See, e.g., In re Paquat's Estate, 101 Ore. 393, 200 Pac. 911 (1921) ; State v.
Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (S.D. Ga. 1890).
35. See, e.g., Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869).
36. 14 Stat. 173 (1866).
37. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
-38. CONG. GIoBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1865). It should be noted that the
amendment is more broadly worded than the companion Civil Rights Act. The Civil
Rights Act enumerated specific provisions guaranteeing all persons the same "security
of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens .. " Civil Rights Act of
1866, 14 Stat. 27, § 1 (Chap. XXXI). The fourteenth amendment contains the sweep-
ing language "equal protection of the laws" instead of the more narrow phrase "equal
protection of life, liberty and property rights," and does not attempt to measure the
rights thus protected by the rights of any racial group.
39. During the debates sponsors of the proposed bills emphasized that there was
no intent to nullify existing state statutes or restrict future miscegenation legislation.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322, 420, 505-06, 632-33 (1865). Twenty-one of
the thirty states relied upon for ratification of the fourteenth amendment continued
their ban on interracial marriage. See generally, Bickel, The Original Understanding
and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955).
40. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (the right to vote) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587 (1935) (jury service) ; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
41. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
42. McLaughlin v. Florida, 85 S.Ct. 283, 287 (1964).
43. Ibid.
44. Only three states prohibit interracial marriage other than the white- "non-
white" category. Maryland prohibits Negro-Malayan marriages, MD. CoD ANN.
art. 27, § 398 (1957); North Carolina prohibits Negroes from marrying Cherokee
Indians of Robeson County, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1950), and Louisiana prohibits
Negro-Indian marriages, LA. CIVIL CoDg art. 94 (1952).
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the reasonableness of the racial classification. The Maryland statute
illustrates this type of classification. The statute restricts the marital
freedom of whites, Negroes, and Malayans but places no racial restric-
tions on, for example, orientals or American Indians.4 5
3. VALID LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE.
The right of a state to enact legislation providing for the reason-
able regulation of marriage to protect the health, safety, and general
welfare of its citizens is universally recognized. The state has a valid
interest in controlling the marriage of persons with a disease that might
endanger a spouse or future offspring, persons under a certain age,
persons within specified degrees of consanguinity or affinity, or feeble-
minded or insane persons. But these restraints are imposed on in-
dividuals, regardless of race, and have been supported by demonstrable
facts that such marriages are contrary to the best interests of society.4 6
Much the same type of argument is proffered in defense of mis-
cegenation statutes. Banning interracial marriage is claimed to be a
reasonable means of accomplishing the valid legislative objectives of
preserving racial purity,47 preventing the birth of mentally and physi-
cally inferior offspring,48 and promoting the cultural level of society.49
However, scientific evidence vitiating the concept of "a pure race"
45. It is interesting to note that in Maryland a mulatto (technically the first
generation offspring of a pure Negro and a pure white) is not prohibited from marry-
ing another mulatto. Yet the child of such union has the same proportion of Negro-
white blood as does a child of the prohibited Negro-white marriage, if it could be said
that racial characteristics are proportionately inheritable.
There have been many attempts to classify mankind into racial groups. One of
the earliest classifications and the one which seems to have gained widest acceptance
in popular usage is that of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, who divided mankind into
five races: Caucasian, Mongolian, Malayan, Ethiopian, and American, or white, yellow,
brown, black and red, respectively. BLUMENBACH, THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TREATISES
OF JOHANN FRIEDRICH BLUMENBACH § IV (1885). Most of the miscegenation statutes
appear to have been based upon this classification. Blumenbach's classifications are no
longer accepted by anthropologists. Darwin, in his revolutionary work, DARWIN, THE
ORIGIN OV THE SPECIES (1859), introduced the concept of the changing nature of races.
The classification most widely accepted by specialists in the field today is that of Garn
and Coon, who list eight geographic races: Amerindian, Polynesian, Microesian,
Melanesian, Asian, (East) Indian, European, and African; Garn and Coon, On the
Number of Races of Mankind, 57 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 966 (1955). Garn later added
Australian as a ninth race, but this is disputed. Garn and Coon discarded the old
concept of race as a "type" of mankind; they have clarified the term by being more
specific as to the exact taxonomic unit under discussion and take into consideration
ecological and phenotypic factors as well as the genotypic factors. One noted anthro-
pologist has said that today there are only Clines (sub-races), not races; Livingstone,
The Nonexistence of Human Races, 3 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 279 (1962). For a
discussion of modern anthropological thinking on the concept of race, see Newman,
Geographic and Microgeographic Races, 4 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 189 (1963). See
also ASHLEY-MONTAGUE, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE
(4th ed. 1964).
46. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
47. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
48. "The amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but is always productive
of deplorable results. Our daily observations show us, that the offspring of these
unnatural connections are generally sick and effeminate, and that they are inferior in
physical development to the fullblood of either race." Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321,
323 (1869).
49. Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483 (1924). It is axiomatic that
culture or the capacity to absorb culture, like religion and language, is not an in-
heritable trait. BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 27 (1934).
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and the relationship between race and mental or cultural achievement
is overwhelming.
In 1952, twelve distinguished scientists under the sponsorship of
the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization(UNESCO) issued a "Statement on the Nature of Race and Race
Differences"5  which has the following relevant conclusions: (1)
"There is no evidence for the existence of so-called 'pure' races ...
[H]uman hybridization has been going on for an indefinite but con-
siderable time"; (2) There is "no basis for believing that the groups of
mankind differ in their innate capacity for intellectual and emotional
development"; (3) "[G]enetic differences are of little significance in
determining the social and cultural differences between different groups
of men."
Justification for miscegenation statutes has also been sought on
the ground that the state has the right to protect future children from
the adverse psychological effects of being a member of neither race and
thereby rejected by both races.,' If this be true, the state could also
prohibit marriage between persons of different religions5 2 or different
ethnic backgrounds.53
During the present century, statutory discrimination based on race
in the areas of education,54 juries, 55 suffrage,50 and residential areas"7
have been found to violate the constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws. The essential result of the recent
segregation decisions - that individuals may not be prohibited because
of their race from enjoying the same privileges and freedoms at the
same time, place and in the same manner as other individuals - when
added to the abundant present-day genetic and anthropological data
refuting the superiority of one race over another, indicates that the
bans on interracial marriage cannot be maintained in light of modern
interpretation of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has never had the opportunity
to rule on the constitutionality of Maryland's miscegenation statute 8
which reads, in part:
"All marriages between a white person and a negro . . . (or) a
person of negro descent, to the third generation, inclusive, or
between a white person and a member of the Malay race or between
a negro . . . (or) a person of negro descent, to the third genera-
50. The full title is "Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences - By
Physical Anthropologists and Geneticists, September, 1952." The text has been printedin many UNESCO publications and is also reprinted in ASHLEY-MONTAGUE, MAN'S
MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY oF RAcE 361 (4th ed. 1964).
51. Louisiana v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So. 2d 233 (1959); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 85 S.Ct. 283 (1964), oral argument in support of Florida's miscegenation
prohibitions by appellee before Supreme Court, Oct. 14, 1964, 33 U.S.L. WLEK 3137
(Oct. 20, 1964).
52. See LAFARGE, THE RAcE QUESTION AND THE NEGRO (PERMISSU SUPERIORUM)
196 (1943), which considers the tensions quite similar.
53. See, GORDON, INTERMARRIAGE (1964), which discusses the problems of inter-
faith, interracial and interethnic marriages.
54. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
56. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).57. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
58. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 389 (1957).
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tion, inclusive, and a member of the Malay race, are forever pro-
hibited and shall be void; and any person violating the provisions
of this section shall be deemed guilty of an infamous crime, and
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than eighteen
months nor more than ten years ....
The constitutionality of this statute was recently attacked in
Medagia v. Gill,59 a case heard in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County. The clerk of the court invoked the statute and refused to issue
a marriage license to permit the plaintiff, a white woman, to marry a
Filipino. The plaintiff, in requesting a writ of mandamus, contended
that the statute was unconstitutional. Judge Menchine adroitly side-
stepped the constitutional issue by holding that, because the particular
Filipino had one white grandmother, he was a person of mixed race;
therefore, his marriage to a white woman was not proscribed.
The holding in Medagia indicates that the Maryland miscegenation
statute, because of its doubtful constitutionality, is unlikely to be en-
forced. Nevertheless it still remains in effect. The Supreme Court in
the principal case, clearly noted that it was reserving its judgment on
the constitutionality of miscegenation statutes. However, one might
argue that when6" the issue does appear directly before the Court in a
justiciable controversy, the validity of such patently unconstitutional
statutes will be at an end.
Lee M. Miller
59. Unreported case in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, decided Feb. 13,
1964. Misc. 7/353/2956.
See also State v. Howard, Daily Record, April 22, 1957. Judge Niles, speaking
for the Supreme Bench of Baltimore, held a statute, which is now MD. CODE ANN.
art. 27, § 416 (1957), providing criminal penalties for a white woman who allows
herself to be begotten with a child by a negro, unconstitutional because the Maryland
statute penalized only the woman.
60. Editor's Note: At the publication of this casenote, the constitutionality of
Virginia's miscegenation statute is being challenged in Loving v. Commonwealth, a
case now pending before the Circuit Court of Caroline County, Virginia.
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